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1. Introduction
The textbook theory of consumer demand assumes that the products consumed are
homogeneous. This is obviously a rather stylized setting since a typical feature is that
products are differentiated with respect to quality attributes. Also prices may vary with respect
to these attributes as well as with respect to geographical location of the stores. This paper
develops a new framework for analyzing consumer demand for differentiated products in the
presence of quality- and location attributes when some of these attributes are unobservable
to the analyst.
Following Lancaster (1979), p. 16; "the problem of analyzing economic systems in
which the goods (or many of them) can be infinitely varied in design and specification has
always been that of finding a workable framework of analysis." The traditional way of dealing
with quality aspects is either simply to increase the number of goods or to apply Hicks
aggregation. Unfortunately, in practice it turns out to be difficult to treat each variant as a
separate observable commodity category. This is related to the fact that it is problematic to
quantify quality precisely. In other words, quality is typically a latent variable which only to
a limited extent can be accounted for by classifying variants of the product under
consideration into a large number of categories. Although many variants can in principle be
classified in observable categories, there will, in practice, be a limit to how many variants one
can treat as separate goods in a demand system. To aggregate goods into composite ones is
also problematic. If consumers have heterogeneous preferences the corresponding price
indexes will be individual specific and can therefore not readily be implemented in empirical
demand analyses!
When unobserved quality attributes are present the econometrician faces a simultaneity
problem. The reason for this is that the random terms in the demand system depend on latent
quality attributes, which in turn are correlated with prices. It is known (see for example
Trajtenberg (1989)) that ignoring this simultaneity problem can lead to upward sloping
demand curves. Moreover, the aggregate demand function in the presence of differentiated
products may depend on the whole distribution of prices—not only on the mean price across
all variants of each product.
It seems that some authors, such as Chamberlin (1933), p. 79, have thought it impossible to carry through a
full formal analysis of variable product design: ...."product variations are in this essence quantitative; they cannot,
therefore, be measured along an axis and displayed in a single diagram".
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Early studies that discuss this problem are the contributions by Houthakker and Prais
(1952 and 1955). While most early work was concerned with practical problems of
econometrics within a simple theoretical framework, contributions such as Fisher and Shell
(1971), Muellbauer (1974) and Lancaster (1979) have dealt with the theoretical foundations.
Rosen (1974), Bartik (1987), Epple (1987), Brown and Rosen (1982) and Berry et al. (1995),
analyse the econometric problems related to estimating demand and supply of differentiated
products. Deaton (1987, 1988) analyses demand in the presence of price variation due to
heterogeneity with respect to latent quality aspects and spatial location of stores, with
particular reference to developing countries. The reason why spatial variation in prices may
occur is because transportation is expensive and it may also be the case that different stores
offer different types of services.
The approach taken here differs from the contributions above. First, the choice setting
is viewed as a discrete/continuous one where the discrete dimension corresponds to the
product variants. Thus, in contrast to the framework which is commonly used (see for
example Rosen (1974)) we perceive the consumer as making his choice from a set of discrete
"packages" of attribute combinations. Second, the random variables associated with
unobserved product attributes and taste-shifters are, similarly to Dagsvik (1994), treated as
integral parts of the choice model. The basic idea of the approach is as follows: Consumers
face a variety of product variants and locations, each of which is characterized by its price
and a variable that may be interpreted as a "quality" index, cf. Lancaster (1977). This quality
index may depend on observable product characteristics (attributes). We thus represent a
consumer's set of feasible variants/locations by a collection of pairs of prices and quality
indexes. Specifically, this set of prices and quality indexes may be summarized in a
distribution function which represents the fraction of feasible variants/locations with prices
and quality indexes less than or equal to a given level of price and quality. As mentioned
above, the consumers are assumed to have preferences over variants/locations which governs
their choice of products and the corresponding quantities. To this end a particular
discrete/continuous random utility choice model is developed, in which the probability
distribution of the prices and quality indexes of the chosen variants/locations is expressed as
a function of parameters of the consumers utility functions and the distribution of prices and
quality indexes associated with the feasible location/variants. In other words, the fraction of
(observational identical) consumers who choose variants/locations with a given price and
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quality is in this model expressed as a function of the distribution of preferences and offered
prices and quality attributes. In the presence of latent quality/location attributes and
unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, the distribution of unit values, i.e., expenditure to
quantity for each commodity, may differ from the distribution of prices. That is, the number
of (latent) variants in the market within a commodity group (observable) with prices below
a given level may differ from the corresponding number of variants purchased by the
consumers. This is due to a selection effect that arises from consumers having preferences
over the variants. By means of the model developed below it is possible to derive a
convenient expression for the distribution of unit values as a function of the distribution of
prices and parameters related to preferences. Furthermore, one can construct price indexes
(which we denote virtual prices) for each (observational) commodity group which account for
the possibility that consumers have preferences over variants/locations that are unobservable
to the analyst. As a result, it follows that the chosen quantities, within the commodity groups,
can be expressed as in a conventional demand system with prices replaced by virtual prices.
Although the virtual prices are unobservable random variables it is possible to identify and
estimate their probability distribution function. Accordingly, one can identify and estimate
parameters of the demand system. In Put II of this paper we discuss estimation issues related
to the framework developed in Part I.
Among the contributions mentioned above, the paper by Berry et al. (1995) is the one
which is the closer to the present paper. However, in contrast to this paper, Berry et al. only
consider the discrete choice case and they also assume that the classification of product
variants relevant to the consumer is observable to the analyst.
The paper is organized as follows: In Sections 2 and 3 we present the theoretical
model and we derive the distribution function for the demand and for the unit values. In
Section 4 we discuss identification in a modified AIDS demand system, cf. Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980). The final section is devoted to the case where consumers only buy one
unit of a product at a time. In this section we also introduce observable (nonpecuniary)
product attributes.
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2. A model for individual purchase that accounts for horizontal and vertical product
differentiation: The basic assumptions
A major problem the analyst faces when dealing with the demand for differentiated
products is that taste-shifters and quality attributes that affect preferences are unobservable.
Below we shall introduce a particular framework that enables us to analyze consumer demand
under aggregation of quality/location attributes.
Consider a consumer (household) which faces a set of products characterized by
quality attributes and price. There are m categories of goods indexed by j, j=1,2,...,m. Within
each category, let z=1,2,..., index an infinite set of stores (location of the stores) and product
variants that are offered for sale in the market. For example, the categories may be beer and
cereals in which case the corresponding variants are the brands of beer and cereals. Let Q(z)
be the quantity of observable type j and unobservable location and variant z and let Ti(z)>O,
be an unobservable quality/location attribute associated with good (j,z), The attributes
{Ti(z)} are objectively measured in the sense that all consumers' perceptions about
aggregation and ranking of characteristics embodied in each good are identical. Consistent
with Lancaster (1979), p. 27, the T-attributes correspond to the notion of vertical product
differentiation. If some characteristics associated with the variants are observable, {Ti(z)} can
be specified as a function of z-specific observable attributes. In this case Tj will be a
(hedonic) quality index. Let P(z) be the price of variant/location z of type j. As regards the
spatial dimension, a natural "unit" is the store because prices of a given variant do not vary
within stores. In general, Pi(z) and Ti(z) may be correlated, cf. Stiglitz (1987). How the
distribution of prices and T-attributes is determined in the market will briefly be discussed
below. The consumer is assumed to be perfectly informed about the distributions of product
locations, variants and prices.
Let
(Q*,T*)	 p i (1),T 1 (1),Q 1 (2),T 1 (2),...,Q2(1),T2(1),Q2(2), T2(2), ...,Qm(
represent the bundle of quantities and quality attributes of different types and variants.
Without loss of generality we may rearrange the components of (Q* ,T*) as
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(Q, x p i (z), T (z),Q2(z),T2(z), ..,Qm(z), T.(z))
which is notationally more convenient than (Q*,T*). The setup above is analogous to the
characteristics approach of Lancaster (1966), where {T(z)} represents the characteristics
dimension. The enumeration in different commodity categories are of course totally
indpendent.
Let U(Q,T) be the associated utility of a (particular) consumer. We make the
following assumption:
Assumption Al 
The utility function has the structure U(Q,T) = u(S1,S2,...,S„), where
= E Q/z)7;(z)Vz), (2.1)
u() is a mapping, u:R.--->k, that is increasing and quasi-concave, and ( k(z), z=1,2,...) are
random positive- taste-shifters that account for unobservable variables that reflect
heterogeneity in consumer taste.
Note that the interpretation of the taste-shifters,
 { k(z)}, is also consistent with
psychological choice theories in which the decision maker is seen as having difficulties with
assessing the precise value (to him) of the consumption bundle. Thus, this notion accounts
for unobserved variables that affect preferences and are known to the household as well as
factors that affect preferences and are random to the household.
The utility structure (2.1) implies that within subgroup j the different qualities are
perfect substitutes, cf. Haneman (1984), p. 548. A consequence of (2.1) is thus that the
consumer will only buy one quality variant at a time, i.e., for a given set of taste-shifters,
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{ ti(z), z=1,2,...,
 j=1,...}, only one variant will be chosen.2 Thus this setup is a version of the
"Ideal Variety Approach" proposed by Lancaster (1979). Krugman (1989) argues that the
Ideal Variety Approach is more realistic than the "Love of Variety Approach" proposed by
Spence (1976), and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The structure in (2.1) is also analogous to the
models investigated by Fisher and Shell (1971), and Gorman (1976). According to Lancaster,
op cit. the taste-shifters, { i(z)}, correspond to the notion of horizontal product differentiation.
In the special case where the only latent choice variable is associated with location,
i.e., z indexes the stores, then the assumption that the consumer only chooses one z at a time
seems natural since it may be fair to view the consumer as choosing a single store each time
he goes shopping.
Yet another interpretation is possible: We may think of z as an indexation of (latent)
"categories", or "baskets", of which basket z, say, consists of "similar" commodities.
Examples of baskets are; sports gear and breakfast menus.
Now let us return to the general analysis, where we shall proceed to derive the
structure of the demand functions. The budget constraint is given by
E E Q(z)P(z) y.
z
	
(2.2)
In order to link the present setup to conventional demand theory we shall now introduce some
additional notation that will facilitate the formal analysis. Let
Rj(z) = Pi(z)/(ti(z)Tj(z)) .	 (2.3)
If (2.3) is inserted into (2.2) we can express the budget constraint as
2The formulation postulated in (2.1) is less restrictive than it appears: We may namely interpret (2.1) as
representing the consumer's preferences at a specific moment of purchase — where we allow the set of taste-
shifters change each time the consumer goes shopping — or fixed within a short period of time. Of course, this
interpretation entails questions about aggregation over time and about the consumers planning horizon. The
problem of assessing a realistic planning horizon is also important for the interpretation of data from
conventional expenditure surveys since these surveys typically contain data on household expenditure based on
short periods of observation (one to three weeks), while a more reasonable notion of "period" in a (static) model
is perhaps one year. In Appendix B we outline a possible simple approach for modifying the model so as to
allow for savings/borrowing within a year.
E E Si(z)Ri(z) y	 (2.4)
z
where
S( z) Qi(z) Ti(z);(z).
Note that maximizing u(S i ,S2,...,Sm) subject to (2.2) is equivalent to maximizing
u(E s l (z),E	 sm(z))
1,
subject to (2.4). Moreover, this optimizing problem is formally equivalent to a conventional
consumer demand problem where Sj(z), z=1,2,..., are perfect substitutes with corresponding
"prices", {Rj(z)}. Thus, we realize that this implies that the consumer will choose only one
(unobservable) quality variant within each observable category. Let
 2 be the index of the
chosen store and variant within category j. Clearly, Zi is determined by
R.(2.) = min Ri(z),J	 J (2.5)
which mean that 2j is the variant with the lowest "price". For notational simplicity, let ki
R(î), 4
 = Qi(2j), Šj = S() and Pi = Pj(2j). Let Ri(r,y) be the expenditure of type j that
follows from maximizing
subject to
UtS S	 S2"*"
E r.s. 5_ y,J
(2.6a)
(2.6b)
where r=(r 1 ,r2,..., . Evidently, we have that
š.k.	 7(..(fi, y)
=	 = 	P.	 P.J
.1	 J
(2.7)
where
= (Apkr..- , Am).
Thus, from (2.7) we realize that formally, we can account for the heterogeneity in quality and
prices by replacing prices in an ordinary demand (expenditure) system by the corresponding
components of k. We shall call {Ri } virtual prices. The virtual price vector, is endogenous
since by (2.5) it is the result from the consumer's choice of location and quality (2). The
virtual prices are taste-and-quality-adjusted-prices in the sense that if these virtual prices were
known, consumer behavior could be represented by an ordinary demand system that does not
depend on quality attributes nor taste-shifters. Note that the virtual prices are unobservable.
Note also that {f} represent unit values, i.e., the respective ratios of expenditure to quantity
for each commodity, and they therefore depend on the consumer's choice.
To obtain analytic expressions we need to make further assumptions about the
distribution of the unobservables. Recall that according to the setup above each
variant/location z of type j is characterized by the attribute vector (Pi(z),Ti(z),4i(z)) where
(Pi(z),Ti(z)) are objectively perceived attributes in the sense that they have the same value
relative to any consumer, while 4i(z), (for fixed (j,z)) may vary across consumers — or over
time for a given consumer. Let
pi = Oi(z),Ti(z),;(z)), = 1,2,. ..}
denote the (consumer-specific) collection of prices, quality attributes and taste-shifters
associated with the feasible variants/stores. To make the setup above operational we need to
introduce assumptions about the distribution of the elements in p i . The next assumption is a
convenient representation of the distribution of taste-shifters and feasible attributes (prices and
quality attributes).
Assumption A2 
The vectors in Pi, j=1,2,...,m, are points of independent inhomogeneous Poisson
processes on R34. with intensity measure associated with Pi equal to
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Gi(dp,dt) pi(e)dE.	 (2.8)
Moreover, the Poisson points associated with different consumers are realizations from
independent copies of the Poisson process.
Recall that the Poisson process framework means that the (vector) points in Pj are
independently distributed and the probability that there is a point in Pj for which
Pi(z)e (p,p+dp), Ti(z)E (t,t+dt) and tj(z)e (E,e+de) is equal to Gi(dp,d0pi(E)cle.
The reason why the Poisson points differ across consumers is because the taste-shifters
ki(z)} are individual specific: Different consumers evaluate the variants differently and the
tastes of a given consumer may also fluctuate randomly over time. The fact that the value of
a store to a given consumer may depend on the distance between him and the store is also
captured in this formulation. Note that this formulation allows prices to vary across products
with given quality. As mentioned in the introduction, a rationale for this is that prices may
vary across stores because different stores/producers have different cost functions due to
transportation and the quality of the services offered by the stores.
In Dagsvik (1994) it is demonstrated that Gi(p,t) can be interpreted as the distribution
of feasible prices and quality attributes. This means that Gi(p,t) is the fraction of all variants
of type j in the market that have prices and quality attributes less than or equal to (p,t). The
multiplicative structure of (2.8) means that the taste-shifters are independent of the prices,
location and quality attributes. A justification for assuming the prices and quality attributes
be independent of the taste-shifters stems from the view that the market forces operate on an
aggregate level in the sense that the respective distributions of supply and demand are
dependent. This means that the intensity measure (2.8) has a functional form that depends
both on the systematic parts of the consumers' utility functions and the producers' profit
functions. However, the distribution of supply and demand may not necessarily coincide
because the firms may have limited information about the distribution of demands when (and
if) they set prices. To perform policy analyses (in a rigorous sense) requires a structural
specification of the price distribution as a function of parameters that characterize both
consumers utility functions and the producers' profit functions.
An interesting point of departure for developing a structural version of the distribution
Gi(p,t) is the approach discussed in Anderson et al. (1992), ch. 6 and 7. The typical argument
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goes as follows: Each firm produces a single variant of a differentiated product. Firms are
uncertain about consumer demand in the market. It is assumed that the firms know the
probability distribution of the aggregate demand for each variant within each commodity
group. From this distribution they can calculate the expected profit conditional on the T-
attributes and the prices. Each firm maximizes the expected profit function with respect to
own price and T-attributes, taking the prices and quality attributes of the variants produced
by other firms as given. Anderson et al. demonstrate that a price equilibrium exists under
general assumptions. It is, however, beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss the
existence and the structure of
 G.
The assumptions about the Poisson process above are rather weak. Specifically, the
independence between Poisson points means that there is a random device that influence the
distribution of points — say in each period — but that on average the distribution of points
is precisely determined by the intensity measure (2.8).
Assumption A2 is, however, too general to produce useful apriori restrictions. The next
assumption regards the functional form of gi(e) and the problem of its theoretical justification.
Assumption A3 
The structure of pi is given by
P (c) = C'c3 2.9)
where c3>0 and ai>0 are constants. Moreover, the Poisson processes Pi, j=1,2,.. .,m, are
independent.
The structure of (2.9) can be justified as follows: Consider the choice of
variant/location within category j. This choice Zi is determined by
= argmin Ri(z) = argmax {;(z) v Rj(z), Pj(z))} (2.10)
where v(x,y) = x/y. But (2.10) shows that this maximization problem corresponds to a version
of the pure choice-of-attribute model in Dagsvik (1994), p. 1196. In particular, Dagsvik
demonstrates that (2.9) follows from a particular version of the "Independence from Irrelevant
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Alternatives" assumption, (IIA), (cf. Dagsvik (1994), Theorem 2 and Remark 1, p. 1185).
As discussed in Dagsvik (1994), (2.9) implies that there are (with probability one) a
finite number of points of the Poisson process for which the taste-shifters are bounded from
below. We realize from (2.9) that the intensity measure tends towards infinity when c-->0. We
may interpret this as follows: Although any combination of price and quality attributes that
are generated from the Gio are feasible, most of the corresponding variants/stores (in fact
infinitely many) are not perceived as "interesting" to the consumer due to the low values of
the associated taste-shifters. Only a finite number of the variants/stores is therefore taken into
account in the consumer's decision process.3
It can easily be demonstrated that (2.9) implies that the dispersion of {ki(z)} increases
when oci
 decreases. On the other hand, when oci--+.0, then {4i(z)} converges towards one in
probability.
3. Aggregate relations
In this section we shall discuss the implications from the general setting introduced
above with particular reference to the distributions of the quality attributes, prices and the
virtual prices associated with the chosen variants. Recall that the prices associated with the
chosen variants are, in the present setting, equivalent to unit values.
Let 6i(p,t) be the c.d.f. of (PA), given that a variant of type j is demanded, and let
g;(p,t) be the corresponding density. In other words, 6i(p,t) is the probability that an agent
shall make a choice such that (15.0, tj.5..t) given that he purchases a positive quantity of
commodity, type j.
Theorem 1 
Under assumptions Al to A3, the virtual price, hi, for any j, is stochastically
independent of the set t(I5k,i'k, k=1,2,...,m). Furthermore, are independent with
c.d.f.
3 A more rigorous argument can be given. By Lemma 1 in Appendix A it follows that for any open set A there
is, with probability one, a Poisson point z in sg ; such that (Pi(z),Ti(z))e A. Esentially, this means that any price
and quality attribute drawn from qo is feasible.
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for r>.0, where
P(15_r)
 =1 - exp(-r a, K)
	 (3.1)
K. LS' 
CJ	 X
*7-1 G(dx, dy) ciEJ 
	 j
(3.2)
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix A.
The constant cj can be viewed as a "normalizing" constant. Since ki is not observable
one can therefore fix ci at any value that is convenient — as we shall do below.
In Theorem 1 it is stated that the virtual prices of the chosen variants are stochastically
independent of the corresponding unit values of the price and quality attributes. At first glanse
this seems counterintuitive. However, the important fact here is that the distribution of the
virtual prices depends on the distribution of the offered prices and quality attributes, since KJ
depends on Gio. That is, due to the "noisy" structure of the preferences and the choice
environment, which follows from the Poisson process setting, the virtual prices and offered
prices are mutually independent across purchases, while the corresponding aggregates are
functionally dependent. Thus, this property corresponds to the notion of bounded rationality
where rational behavior is only assumed to hold on an aggregate level while the choices from
one moment to the next may be erratic and inconsistent.
A c.d.f. with the structure given in (3.1) is called a Weibull distribution, cf. Johnson
and Kotz (1972).
Corollary 1 
Under the assumptions of Theorem I it follows that
IC -"aT (3.3)
14
(3.7)Vark.1= .	
(Eki)2
k	 2= KJ -2 t / +--
a.
'
ElogI =	 - 1 logK.
a
.1
.	 a.	 )
and
0°002 41°002 Tc2
	(3.6)
6a.f
where y is Euler's constant;	 .
Proof:
Eq. (3.3) and (3.4) follow readily from the definition of the Gamma function. Eq. (3.5)
and (3.6) follow from the fact that (3.1) implies that, -logki is type III extreme value
distributed.4
Q.E.D.
From (3.3) and (3.4) it follows that ai satisfies
(3.4)
(3.5)
where we recocognize the right hand side of (3.7) as the coefficient of variation. It can be
demonstrated that the left hand side of (3.7) is (strictly) decreasing in ai and accordingly,
large al
 corresponds to a small coefficient of variation in the distribution of
4 There is some confusion in the literature: In the terminology of Johnson and Kotz (1972), (3.1 ) is a type III
extreme value distribution, while it is denoted type I by other authors.
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Theorem 2 
Suppose Al to A3 hold. Then
j(dp, dt) =  P 
15(2-7,) G fdx, dy)
x 
a
Gi(dp, dt)
(3.8)
The proof of Theorem 2 follows directly from Dagsvik (1994), Theorem 7.
The result of Theorem 2 shows that, in general, the distribution of the unit values may
differ from the price distribution of the variants that are offered for sale in the stores. This
is so due to the fact that the random taste-shifters, { ti(z)}, induce a selection effect. When
ai decreases this selection effect eventually becomes negligible. The intuition is that when the
dispersion of {ti(z)} is large the choice of variant and location will be completely random
because in a distributional sense,
Qj(z)Tj(z)ti(z)a,
so that ; is determined from the maximization of ti(z)a' . In other words, the consumer has
in this case no systematic preference for any attribute and consequently no systematic
selection effect will take place since the choice of variant is completely random.
Corollary 2 
If and only if prices are determined such that
Ti(z) = biPi(z),	 (3.9)
(with probability one) where b3>0, j=1,2,...,m, are constants, then 61p,t) = Glp,t), which
means that supply equals demand. In this case (3.2) reduces to
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K. =
.1	 .1	 •
(3.10)
Proof:
Assumption (3.9) means that Gi(dp10=1, when t/bj E (p,p+dp) and zero otherwise,
where Gi(plt) is the conditional distribution of prices in category j given that Ti(z)=.4. From
Theorem 2 and Theorem 1 the result of Corollary 2 follows.
Q.E.D.
If both prices, Ti-attributes as well as unit values and chosen attributes, { (f)i,t) }, were
observed then (3.8) could be utilized to estimate aj without additional assumptions about
gj •). Moreover, one could test the utility specification indirectly by testing the particular
functional form of (3.8) on the basis of non-parametric estimates of qo and 4().
Unfortunately, the quality attributes are rarely observable and accordingly (3.8) is not readily
applicable for empirical analyses. To this end the next result is useful.
Corollary 3 
Let
X.i(p) E(7;(z)a) I Piz)
	 (3.11)
and assume that the density, gip), of the marginal price distribution exists. Eq. (3.8) implies
that the marginal density of unit values can be expressed as
-05 2‘• (n n.
VP) = 	Jr1611" 
j	 f:x -a, 2(x) gi(x)dx
(3.12)
Moreover,
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K. = c.fx -a, X.(x)g.(x)dx.JJ	 JJ
R .
(3.13)
The result of Corollary 3 demonstrates that when {T i(z)} is unobservable then a most p Xj(p)
can be identified from the relationship between the respective distribution of prices and unit
values.
Proof: 
By (3.8) we can express gi(p) as
p -ai
g1)) = 	
g(p) E(Tj(z)ai Pi(z) =p
-( fx -ai gi(x) E(Ti(z)ai I Pi(z) = dx
R,
Eq. (3.12) now follows immediately and (3.13) follows from (3.2).
Q.E.D.
The function A.,i() is in fact a (preference-adjusted) conditional aggregate quality ,
index. Specifically, 2t.,j(p) expresses the conditional mean value across variants of the
quality/location attributes given price level p. It is adjusted for heterogeneity in tastes through
the parameter a. In general it is desirable to link 2Li(p) to observable attributes of the product
variants. For simplicity, we shall defer the introduction of observable nonpecuniary attributes
till Section 6. From the discussion there it will become evident that the approach in Section
6 also applies to the present case with divisible products.
From Corollary 3 the next result is immediate.
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Corollary 4 
If
*pa' IP(z) =P) w
	 (3.14)
where w3>0 is a constant, then by (3.12) the distribution of unit values equals the distribution
of prices.
Note, however, that ki(p) = gi(p) does not necessarily mean that the equilibirum
condition, ki(p,t) = gi(p,t) holds, cf. Corollary 2.
Corollary 5 
The parameter Ki of the virtual price distribution can be expressed as
cE(T (z)a)
	K. c,E _ . ,
	 J.1 piz) j
	T iz)
	= c..E(Plz)-aiXJ(Plz))) =
	 (^ a)E P.J
1	 1	
-1 
	= / EJ
(3.15)
Moreover,
(3.16)
Proof:
The first and second equality of (3.15) follow from (3.2) and (3.13). From (3.12) we
Kj g;(1))P
	  = Op) ci
2■,;(p)
(3.17)
get
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which implies that
K. fx aj k'.(x) dx K. E(15 .ai) = c. fk.(x) g.(x) dx c. E (Pi(z))) = ci E T.(z)ajJ	 J	 J	 J	 J	 J	 J	 J	 k	 J
R.
3.18)
and
X ai g .( x) dx
.f 
	J = K E
A(x)	 J
(3.19)  
J ) 
and thus the last equality in (3.15) has been proved. Also (3.16) follows from (3.17) and
(3.18).
Q.E.D.
Corollary 5 demonstrates that once aj
 and Xi() have been estimated it is sufficient to
have observations on unit values to obtain an estimate of N.
Although it is not of primary focus in this paper the results concerning the c.d.f. of
virtual prices can be applied to obtain price indexes. From Theorem 1, Corollary 2 and
Corollary 5 it follows that	 ilc" can be interpreted as a price index. By (3.15) we can
express this price index as
-1/a	 ( J
J
K	
R
	A(x) g(x) dxJ	 J	 J	 J	 J
•
(3.20)
where ci can be chosen so as to adjust the level of the index to be equal to the corresponding
price level in a reference year. In contrast to the conventional price indexes, (3.20) is in fact
a price index functional, since is depends on the whole probability distribution of prices.
A fundamental question is to which extent we can identify the distribution of the
virtual prices and the corresponding demand system.
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P -°52;(13) = 	
X.i(1) gi(p) gi(1)
gi(p)fti(1)
Corollary 6 
Assume that (p) and gip) are known. Under the assumptions of Theorem i it follows
that p --c5 k.(p) is non-parametrically identified apart from a multiplicative constant.
Proof:
From (3.12) we get
which yields the above results.
Q.E.D.
We found above that
 i(p)p -a, is only identified up to a multiplicative constant.
Unless we impose additional structure on X(p) or on the corresponding utility function
introduced in Al we cannot pursue this matter further. We shall next introduce an additional
assumption and examine the implications thereof.
Assumption A4 
For each commodity group j,
?L(p) *Pa' 'Piz) =P
aiKiE(Tiz)a) (3.21)
E(Pj(z)al
where Ki is a constant (possible time dependent).
Before we discuss the interpretation of A4 we state an immediate result.
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Corollary 7 
Under A4, (3.12) and (3.13) reduce to
a .x. -a. 	 )p Tip
CCA g j( x)
 dx (3.22)
and
T( z)1 E
Ki = cj 	
E(P/Z)al
(3.23)
Under Assumption A4 it follows that
a2 E(rj(z)cs 1 1);(z)Œi =3') (ici -1) y 2
 E (T;(z)1 
a y 2
E(Pj(z) )
Consequently, under A4 the function X.6,111 is convex when Kj>1 and concave when K. 1J	 l<
The interpretation is that when Kj<1, then the dependence between Ti( ) and Pi(z)a, is
weakened when the price level increases, while when ici>1 this dependence is strenghtened
when the price level increases. The latter case means that price is perceived as an increasingly
more "reliable" proxy for quality as the price level increases. Without real loss of generality,
suppose now that the probability mass of prices less than one is negligible. From (3.22) we
realize that Kj<1 implies that ki(p) is more skew to the left than gi(p), while the opposite is
true when K>1. The reason is of course that when Kj>l, increasing prices do not reduce the
attractiveness of the product variants as much as when because high prices are perceived
as a strong indication of high quality, and vice versa.
As regards identification, Assumption A4 is not sufficient to fully resolve the issue
unless we are willing to make assumptions about how E(Ti(z)1 j=1,2,...,m, changes over
time (cf. (3.23)).
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4. A special case: AIDS demand system
Let wj, denote the budget share of type j for a particular consumer in period 't and
let {k}, {Pit(z)} and {Pit } be the corresponding virtual prices, prices and unit values. Now
assume that the appropriate demand system is an AIDS model given by
= hj E B iklogk + fl i log(y,/qt)
k
and
log	 + E hk logRk^
	!E Ej=1 S jk log R., log
k
	
111
where y, is total expenditure for the consumer in period T, {f3j }, {hk } and {8ik ) are unknown
parameters which satisfy
J = 1, 8 jk	 8 kj
and
E 8 1 = E 8 - "-= E 13 - = 05
k	 j
(cf. Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). For simplicity, we rule out the possibility of corner
solutions. By Corollary 1 we have
(4.1)
(4.2)
Ew. = h. -
it	 J	 A-. 5 i
k=1
(
ak
N
1
- log Kkr 	ß j Elogy i, P j Elogqi,
ak
(4.3)
where
E log cir 	- E hk
k=1
+ _1 log Kk,
ak ak
jk2 k= 1 j= 1
(4.4)
(
	+ -
	 log K.,
	
+ 1 logKk,7 1
	o . 	 oc.	 al 	 oc 	 oc
	J 	 J	 A k	 k
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and y=0.5772..., is Euler's constant. Provided one is willing to assume that E Tit( )1 is
constant over time, there is no loss of generality in assuming that
ciE(Tit(z)ai) = 1
which by (3.15) imply that
itlog Kit = -logE	 )• ai
The identification and estimation of this — and the linear expenditure system will be
discussed in Part II of this paper.
The analysis in this section can, as mentioned above, easily be extended to the case
in which nonpecuniary attributes are present. We refer to the next section for details about
this extension.
5. Discrete choice
In the context of qualitative choice — such as the demand for durables, choice among
jobs and schooling decisions — the set of feasible alternatives is typically discrete.  Berry et
al. (1995) have developed a discrete choice technique to analyze demand with latent quality
attributes. Their approach differs from the one described below in that Berry et al. assume
that the classification of product variants relevant to the consumers is observable. In addition,
their assumptions about the stochastic elements of the model differ from the assumptions
invoked here.
In this section we shall modify the analysis above so as to apply in the discrete choice
setting in which the consumer only purchases one unit of a product variant at a time. Thus
the vector of quantities, Q, has components that are either zero or one.
Specifically, we now assume the following:
(4.5)
(4.6)
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Assumption A5 
The utility function has the structure
u(Q, =u[E z Q(z)Tlz) (z)
where Qj(z) E (0,. 1], for all j and z.
In contrast to Assumption Al, A5 implies that apart from the quality attributes and
taste-shifters, the goods enter symmetrically in the model.
Assumption A5 means that there is no difference between product types and product
variants within types, as regards the structure of the preferences. Below we shall, however,
distinguish between "types" and "variants" by letting product heterogeneity be larger between
types than within types.
The implication from (5.1) is that the consumer will choose a single variant within a
single commodity group. Similarly to the analysis of Section 2 it follows that
Q(î) = i 4=> ki =min Rk(r) = min ftk
k,r	 k
Let
 H denote the choice probability defined by
H. P R. =minkk
k
Theorem 3 
Under assumptions A2, A3 and AS the probability that a consumer shall purchase a
product variant of type j is given by
K.
H = 	J
E Kr
(5.1)
(5.2)
(5.3)
(5.4)
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Proof:
Let yi -ailoglkj . From (3.1) it follows that Vi has c.d.f.
= P(Iki >e	 = exp(-e	 (5.5)
But this means that yi logKj + Ili , where 11012,...,im, are independent with extreme value
c.d.f., exp( -e-Y). But then (5.4) follows immediately from a familiar result in discrete choice
theory (cf. Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985), because minimization of I is equivalent to
maximization of
Q.E.D.
In many fields of discrete choice, such as choice of housing, residential location,
tourist destinations, etc., the consumer faces many product variants of each type, and it is
often the case that in addition to prices, nonpecuniary attributes associated with the chosen
variants are observable to the analyst. We shall now extend the framework developed above
to take into account observable attributes that characterize the variants. Let X(z) denote the
observable nonpecuniary attribute (possible vector-valued) associated with variant z of type
J.
To focus on the potential for empirical applications we shall express the choice
probabilities under additional assumptions about the distribution of {Ti(z)}.
Assumption A6 
The vectors in id
	 [(Plz),7iz),Xlz),(z)),	 j=1,2,...,m, are points of
independent inhomogeneous Poisson processes on R+3 xRxR, with intensity measure associated
with pi
 equal to
G .(dp, dt clx) e -II, c .de ,	 (5.6)
where ocj>0, c3>0.
Clearly, A6 is an immediate extension of A2 and A3.
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Assumption A7 
For each commodity group j,
	Efri(z)a,
 Wiz) =x) = e x	 (5.7)
where Oj is a parameter (vector).
Assumption A7 implies that we can predict the mean value of Ti(z)a, if we know the
distribution of { Xj(z) } .
Theorem 4 
Under assumptions A5 to A7,
	C i/E 15;5 exp(A0i 	(5.8)
where if denotes the chosen X-attribute.
Proof:
Similarly to Theorem 2 it follows that
6j(dp, dt. dx)
Gi(dp, dt. dx)   
(5.9)
where the last equality follows from Corollary 5. From 5.9 we obtain that
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p aidtdx) = c. t ai G (dp, dt, dx),
Ki
(5.10)
which together with A7 implies that
E(Piaiexp(-kj O. oci)) = EE(Pia'exp(-ki ej ai) I ki)
j E (exp ( -Xj(z)
 0  E (zT. )cs X.(z)
= E (exp ( -kJ ei ai) E (f) icS lkj)) = c J
Ki 	 . .J
Q.E.D.
Theorems 3 and 4 suggest that it may be possible to estimate faj l and { ej } solely
from observations on unit values and chosen X-attributes without imposing restrictions on the
conditional moment, Efri(z)ai IPj(z),Xj(z)). However, for the purpose of analyzing the effect
from a change in the distribution of prices and nonpecuniary attributes, it is necessary also
to make assumptions about the conditional moment. A direct extension from Assumption A4
would be to make the following assumption:
Assumption A8 
For each commodity group j,
E(7iejlPj(z) =p,
 X3(z) =x
cc.x.p
E(P Zr
(5.11)
where ej and Ki are parameters.
From Assumption A8 it follows that we can express Ki
 as
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K.(x) c.EJ	 J
f(	 ■05
T J.(z)
I Xi(z) = xP.(z)
(5.14)
E (1) .(z)ai lci exp(X :(z) O. a.))
K. 	J 	 J D J
E(Pi(z)csKi)
(5.12)
Let us finally consider the relevance of the present setup for the theory and estimation
of hedonic price indexes.
 Recall from the discussion following Theorem 1 that within the
Poisson process framework proposed in this paper, dependence between virtual prices and
attributes and prices must be understood in a "distributional sense". Consequently, we shall
interpret the hedonic price index as the mean virtual price when the set of feasible attributes
and prices are generated by the conditional distributions, Gi(p,t1x), given x, j=1,2,...,m. The
corresponding virtual price distributions (cf. Theorem 1) thus take the form
P (ki(x)	 = 1 - exp (-r ai Ki(X))
	 (5.13)
where
Similarly to (3.3) we get
Efki(x) = K.(x) -uaiFJ (5.15)
We shall interpret (5.15) as our hedonic price index. Recall that Eki may also be interpreted
as a price index. To distinguish the two price index definitions we may call Eki(x) and EP.i
the conditional and unconditional hedonic price indexes, respectively. While Eki(x) depends
on the conditional distribution of offered prices given level x of the nonpecuniary attributes,
Eki
 depends on the unconditional distribution of offered prices and attributes.
When Assumption A8 holds we get immediately from (5.14) and (5.10) that
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_1/a,
E(Pj(z)ai ls)
_ci E(Pi(z)ai )s -ai)
(
r 1 =e
a.
Eft(x) = e -1/ar+ ,__ •Cia.
I
1/a, (
5.16)
6. Conclusions
When consumer goods differ by quality and location, traditional demand analysis is
no longer appropriate. In this paper we have demonstrated that by means of a particular
probabilistic framework for discrete and continuous choice, it is possible to modify standard
consumer theory to accommodate a rather general environment with a rich variety of product
variants with product characteristics that may partly be unobservable to the analyst.
Finally, we present the corresponding analysis for the case of demand for indivisible
goods of which some of the attributes may be observable and we also outline how hedonic
price indexes can be established.
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Appendix A 
Lemma 1 
Suppose that A2 holds and that
E,
fi.i.(e)dE = 0.
c,10	 j
Then with probability one there exists a point z in pjfor which (Plz),Ti(z)E A), where A is an
arbitrary open Borel set in le
Proof:
Recall first that if A is a Borel set in R.2, the probability density of the number of
points within A A x [e 1 ,e2], Ni(Ä), for e i<E2, is given by
Kik
 n
13 (1\1j(Ä.- ) =11) 	 exp(-1\40
n!
where
M(Ã) = fGi(dp,dt) pi(E) de .
Hence, it follows that for A = [p,p+dp] x [t,t+dt] we get
(
P(NjCik )>. 1) = i - exp
£2
- Gi(dp,dt) fl.tj(E) de
E,
Now suppose that 1.1j has the property that
£2
lim	 de ---400 .
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Then it follows that P(Ni(Ä)>A) converges towards one as e l -> O.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1:  
Recall that (15i,t) is defined by Pi=Pi(;), ti=Tj(2) where 
(	 (
T(z)
2. a= rgmaxz a.log jJ	 J
	P(z)
\   
(A.1)  
where 4;(z)=ailogj(z). Let A be a Borel set in R2. and define
f
1,j(A) = maxi ai log
(p,(z), Ti(z)) e A
(
T :(z)
	
J	 +4;(z)
P.(z)
	\ J	 j
(A.2)
and
)L.(A = maxi ai logJ
(1),(z),Ti(z))e A \
Tj(z)
P.(z)
-1
	I
(A.3)
It follows that Li(A) and Li(A) are stochastically independent because maximum is taken over
-
Poisson points in disjoint sets, A and A. Moreover, it can be demonstrated that Li(A) and
L(A) are extreme value distributed (type 111) i.e.
P(Li(C)...x) = exp(-Di(C)e -x)
for C equal to A and A, respectively, where
	D i(C) = c	 v. 	g(j ,x,y) dx dy.
	
,	 xkx,y)ec
(See Dagsvik (1994), for a proof of this.) We have
(A.4)
(A.5)
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P ((15j, ti) E A, kj
= 141,j(A)>Li(A-.), max(Li(A),Lj A	 -a,
= P(Li(A)>Lj(A),_Li(A)<r
Now by straight forward calculus (A.4) and (A.6) yield
P ((f)j, ti) E A, kj >
Dj(A)
	 exp(-r --°`'ODi A Di
 A
Di(A) +Di(A)
= P(Li(A)>Li(A	 .))P(max(Li(A),Li(A1))
= P ti) E P >r)
which proves that Ñ. and (f,î') are independent. Moreover, (A.7) also implies that
P(!>r) = exp(- -a, (Dj(A) +Dj( ))).
Since
D.(A) + Di(Ä) = NAUÄ) = Di (R+2) =
(3.2) follows.
(A.6)
(A.7)
A.8)
Q.E.D.
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Appendix B 
Allowing for savings/borrowing within a year
In the model framework developed above we treated the total expenditure, yt, in
period 't as exogenous. We shall now allow yt to be determined according to the
maximization of
T-1
E a T U(Q,,T)
v=o
subject to
T-1 mE EE Q;(z)pit(z)dt y
;=,	 z
(B.2)
where
d, = (1 +r)',
r is the interest rate and a=(1+0-1 , where f is the rate of time preference, and y is now the
total income over T periods which is assumed to be exogenous.
Due to the structure of (B.1) and (B.2) the optimizing problem can be formulated as
a two-stage budgeting problem where the incomes to be spent in each period are determined
in the first stage and consumptions within periods are determined in the second stage. If yt
is the (chosen) income to be spent in period it the corresponding indirect utility as of period
v(y), follows from (2.7) i.e.
v(y) = u
	 (11,, y„)/P i ,	 ytytemT) .
The first stage optimization problem can thus be expressed as maximizing
T-1E a 't vt(yt)
subject to
(B.3)
(B.4)
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yd (8.5)
In the case where the demand system has the structure (5.1) it follows that the period-
specific indirect utility is given by
\
[	
m	 m
v(y) = log yt -E yi ki, - E f3 logÑ.i=1	 j	 j=1
(B.6)
From (B.4), (8.5) and (B.6) it follows readily that the corresponding first stage solution is
given by
T-1E
(
T-1	 m
	a 't y-E d E	 1 -a)k	 'j R kj=1 
(1a T)d,,
In the particular case when r=0 and a=1, (B.7) reduces to
(
1 1 (B.7)
= E
J .1	 '
T-1 m
-E E
k=0 j=1
(B.8)
jk
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